locate. Location sharing the server cannot watch.
Family location sharing is the harder problem: it needs a server. Most apps solved that by letting the server see everything, and some then sold what it saw. locate solves it by building the server blind. End-to-end encrypted. The relay forwards packets it cannot read.
The relay stores ciphertext. It reads none of it.
what we store: ciphertext. what we can read: nothing.
Why this is proof two.
zero proved the principle where no server is needed. locate proves it where one is. The industry position says location sharing requires a company that can see the locations. It does not. It requires a company that can move them. Encryption happens on your phone, decryption on your family's phones, and the keys never touch us. locate is designed so that if our relay were ever seized, subpoenaed, or sold, its contents would be the same to the new owner as they are to us: noise.
- What shipsLocation sharing for the people you choose. Nothing public, nothing social, no contact upload.
- KeysGenerated and held on your devices only. We cannot reset them, read them, or hand them over.
- ProofA whitepaper documenting the cryptographic architecture, and an independent security audit with its findings published. Neither is out yet. Verify, then trust.
The datasheet so far.
- Part
- LP-02
- Status
- In development. Not in any app store. Where it stands
- Encryption
- End-to-end
- Content the relay can read
- 0
- What the relay can see
- Network metadata. Listed below
- Accounts
- No identity beyond your keys
- Verify
- Whitepaper and independent audit. Not published yet
What the relay can see.
"Cannot read" is about content: where you are, who is in your circle, what anything says. A relay still has to move the packets, and moving packets shows it things. This is the list, by design. The whitepaper will carry the final one.
- IP and timingThe relay, and anyone on the network path, sees the IP address of each device and when it connects and sends.
- Groups, unnamedDevices in one circle talk in a matching rhythm. The relay can tell that some connections belong together, and how many are sending. It does not learn who they are.
- Stored ciphertextThe relay holds some encrypted messages for a limited time, so a phone that was offline can catch up. It cannot read them.
- Wake signalsOn iPhone, the app has to be woken by a push with nothing in it. Apple sees that a wake was sent, to which device and when. Never why.
- Install recordGoogle Play or the App Store knows you downloaded the app.
- The lawA court can demand this metadata. Nobody can demand your locations from us, because we never hold them in readable form.
- PeopleSomeone you share with can screenshot what they see. Software cannot stop that, or stop a person being forced to share.
the company-wide list: the noise floor
Where it stands.
- What we saidThat September 2026 would bring three things: the whitepaper, an independent security audit, and a beta waitlist.
- What happenedNone of the three is out. September passed and this page kept the old line. That was wrong, and this is the correction.
- Where it isIn development and being tested on real phones. Not in any app store.
- What is nextThe whitepaper and the audit come before anyone is asked to trust the app. There is no new date. A date goes on this page only when the thing it promises can be checked.
- Following alongThere is no waitlist yet, and nothing on this page collects your email. Updates will be posted here.
When it exists, it will be here, with the whitepaper and the audit report to check it against. Back to the protocol.